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Lessons of History and
Lessons of Vietnam
David H. Petraeus
This article was first published in the Autumn 1986 issue of Parameters.

One of the few unequivocally sound lessons of history is that the
lessons we should learn are usually learned imperfectly if at all.
—Bernard Brodie1
Trying to use the lessons of the past correctly poses two dilemmas.
One is the problem of balance: knowing how much to rely on the
past as a guide and how much to ignore it. The other is the problem
of selection: certain lessons drawn from experience contradict others.
—Richard Betts2
Of all the disasters of Vietnam, the worst may be the “lessons” that
we’ll draw from it. . . . Lessons from such complex events require
much reflection to be of more than negative worth. But reactions to
Vietnam . . . tend to be visceral rather than reflective.
—Albert Wohlstetter3

I

Of all the disasters of Vietnam the worst could be our unwillingness
to learn enough from them.
—Stanley Hoffman4

n seeking solutions to problems, occupants of high office frequently turn to
the past for help. This tendency is an enormously rich resource. What was
done before in seemingly similar situations and what the results were can be
of great assistance to policy-makers. As this article contends, however, it is
important to recognize that history can mislead and obfuscate as well as guide
and illuminate. Lessons of the past, in general, and the lessons of Vietnam,
in particular, contain not only policy-relevant analogies, but also ambiguities
and paradoxes. Despite such problems, however, there is mounting evidence
that lessons and analogies drawn from history often play an important part in
policy decisions.5
Major David H. Petraeus is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social
Sciences, US Military Academy. He is a graduate of the Military Academy and the US
Army Command and General Staff College, and he holds an M.P.A. from Princeton
University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Major Petraeus
has served with the 1st Battalion (Airborne) 509th Infantry in Vicenza, Italy, and with
the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia. This article draws on
his research for a doctoral dissertation on military thinking about the use of force in the
post-Vietnam era.

48Parameters

Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam

Political scientists, organizational psychologists, and historians have
assembled considerable evidence suggesting that one reason decision-makers
behave as they do is that they are influenced by lessons they have derived
from certain events in the past, especially traumatic events during their lifetimes. “Hardly anything is more important in international affairs,” writes Paul
Kattenburg, “than the historical images and perceptions that men carry in their
heads.”6 These images constitute an important part of the “intellectual baggage”
that policy-makers carry into office and draw on when making decisions.
Use of history in this way is virtually universal. As diplomatic historian
Ernest May has pointed out, “Eagerness to profit from the lessons of history
is the one common characteristic in the statecraft of such diverse types as
Stanley Baldwin, Adolf Hitler, Charles de Gaulle, and John F. Kennedy.” Each
was “determined to hear the voices of history, to avoid repeating the presumed
mistakes of the past.”7 President Reagan appears to be similarly influenced by
the past. His “ideas about the world flow from his life,” The New York Times’
Leslie Gelb contends, “from personal history . . . a set of convictions lodged in
his mind as maxims.”8
Perceived lessons of the past have been found to be especially important during crises. When a sudden international development threatens national
security interests and requires a quick response, leaders are prone to draw on
historical analogies in deciding how to proceed. Indeed, several studies have
concluded that “the greater the crisis, the greater the propensity for decisionmakers to supplement information about the objective state of affairs with
information drawn from their own past experiences.”9
The use of historical analogies by statesmen, however, frequently is
flawed. Many scholars concur with Ernest May’s judgment that “policy-makers
ordinarily use history badly.”10 Numerous pitfalls await those who seek guidance from the past, and policy-makers have seemed adept at finding them.
Those who employ history, therefore, should be aware of the common fallacies
to which they may fall victim. As Alexis de Tocqueville warned, misapplied
lessons of history may be more dangerous than ignorance of the past.11
The first error that policy-makers frequently commit when employing
history is to focus unduly on a particularly dramatic or traumatic event which
they experienced personally.12 The last war or the most recent crisis assumes
unwarranted importance in the mind of the decision-maker seeking historical
precedents to illuminate the present. This inclination often is unfounded. There
is little reason why those events that occurred during the lifetime of a particular
leader and thus provide ready analogies should in fact be the best guides to the
present or future. Just because the decision-maker happened to experience the
last war is no reason that it, rather than earlier wars, should provide guidance
for the contemporary situation.13
The fallacy of viewing personal historical experience as most relevant
to the present—without carefully considering alternative sources of comparison—is compounded by a tendency to remove analogies from their unique
contextual circumstances. Having seized on the first analogy that comes to
mind, in too many instances policy-makers do not search more widely. Nor,
contends Ernest May, “do they pause to analyze the case, test its fitness, or
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even ask in what ways it might be misleading.”14 Historical outcomes are thus
absorbed without paying careful attention to the details of their causation, and
the result is lessons that are superficial and overgeneralized, analogies applied
to a wide range of events with little sensitivity to variations in the situation.15
The result is policy made, in Arthur Schlesinger’s words, through “historical
generalization wrenched illegitimately out of the past and imposed mechanically on the future.”16
Finally, once persuaded that a particular event or phenomenon is repeating itself, policy-makers are prone to narrow their thinking, seeing only those
facts that conform to the image they have chosen as applicable. Contradictory
information is filtered out. “As new information is received,” observes Lloyd
Jensen, “an effort is made to interpret that information so that it will be compatible with existing images and beliefs.”17
In sum, lessons of the past are not always used wisely. Proper employment of history has been the exception rather than the rule. Historical analogies
often are poorly chosen and overgeneralized. Their contextual circumstances
frequently are overlooked. Traumatic personal experiences often exercise
unwarranted tyranny over the minds of decision-makers. History is so often
misused by policy-makers, in fact, that many historians agree with Arthur
Schlesinger’s inversion of Santayana: “Those who can remember the past are
condemned to repeat it.”18

The Lessons of Vietnam
It is not surprising that lessons taken from America’s experience in
Indochina have influenced the views and advice of US military leaders on virtually all post-Vietnam security crises in which the use of force was considered.
This has been particularly evident in those cases where the similarities to US
involvement in Indochina have been perceived to be most striking, such as the
debate over American policy toward Central America.19
The frustrating experience of Vietnam is indelibly etched in the minds
of America’s senior military officers, and from it they seem to have taken three
general lessons. First, the military has drawn from Vietnam a reminder of the
finite limits of American public support for US involvement in a protracted
conflict. This awareness was not, of course, a complete revelation to all in the
military. Among the 20th-century wars the United States entered, only World
War II enjoyed overwhelming support.20 As early as the 19th century, Alexis
de Tocqueville had observed that democracies—America’s in particular—were
better suited for “a sudden effort of remarkable vigor, than for the prolonged
endurance of the great storms that beset the political existence of nations.”
Democracies, he noted, do not await the consequences of important undertakings with patience.21
After World War II, General George C. Marshall echoed that judgement, warning that “a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War.”22 Yet such
prescient observations as de Tocqueville’s and Marshall’s were temporarily
overlooked; and, for those in the military, Vietnam was an extremely painful
reaffirmation that when it comes to intervention, time and patience are not
American virtues in abundant supply.

50Parameters

Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam

Second, the military has taken from Vietnam (and the concomitant
repercussions in the Pentagon) a heightened awareness that civilian officials are
responsive to influences other than the objective conditions on the battlefield.23
A consequence has been an increase in traditional military suspicions about
politicians and political appointees. This generalization, admittedly, does not
hold true across the board and has diminished somewhat in the past few years.
Nonetheless, while the military still accepts emphatically the constitutional
provision for civilian control of the armed forces,24 there remain from the
Vietnam era nagging doubts about the abilities and motivations of politicians.
The military came away from Vietnam feeling, in particular, that the civilian
leadership had not understood the conduct of military operations, had lacked
the willingness to see things through, and frequently had held different perceptions about what was really important.25 Vietnam was also a painful reminder
that the military, not the transient occupants of high office, generally bears the
heaviest burden during armed conflict. Vietnam gave new impetus to what
Samuel Huntington described in the 1950s as the military’s pacifist attitude.
The military man, he wrote, “tends to see himself as the perennial victim of
civilian warmongering. It is the people and the politicians, public opinion and
governments who start wars. It is the military who have to fight them.”26 As
retired General William A. Knowlton told members of the Army War College
class of 1985: “Remember one lesson from the Vietnam era: Those who ordered
the meal were not there when the waiter brought the check.”27
Finally, the military took from Vietnam a new recognition of the limits
of military power in solving certain types of problems in world affairs. In particular, Vietnam planted doubts in many military minds about the ability of US
forces to conduct successful large-scale counterinsurgencies. These misgivings
do not in all cases spring from doubts about the capabilities of American troops
and units per se; even in Vietnam, military leaders recall, US units never lost
a battle. Rather, the doubts that are part of the Vietnam legacy spring from a
number of interrelated factors: worries about a lack of popular support for what
the public might perceive as ambiguous conflicts;28 the previously mentioned
suspicions about the willingness of politicians—not just those in the executive
branch—to stay the course;29 and lurking fears that the respective services have
yet to come to grips with the difficult tasks of developing the doctrine, equipment, and forces suitable for nasty little wars.30
These lessons have had a chastening effect on military thinking. A
more skeptical attitude is brought to the analysis of possible missions. “We’ve
thrown over the old ‘can-do’ idea,” an Army Colonel at Fort Hood told The
New York Times’ Drew Middleton, “Now we want to know exactly what they
want us to do and how they think we can accomplish it.” Henceforth, senior
military officers seem to feel, the United States should not engage in war unless
it has a clear idea why it is fighting and is prepared to see the war through to a
successful conclusion.31
Vietnam also increased the military inclination toward the “all or
nothing” type of advice that characterized military views during the Eisenhower
Administration’s deliberations in 1954 over intervention in Dien Bien Phu and
the Kennedy Administration’s discussions over intervention in Laos in 1961.
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There is a conviction that when it comes to the use of force, America should
either bite the bullet or duck, but not nibble.32 “Once we commit force,” cautions
Army Chief of Staff General John Wickham, “we must be prepared to back
it up as opposed to just sending soldiers into operations for limited goals.”33
Furthermore, noted Wickham’s predecessor, General Edward C. Meyer, before
his retirement in 1983, commanders must be “given a freer hand in waging war
than they had in Vietnam.”34 In this view, if the United States is to intervene,
it should do so in strength, accomplish its objectives rapidly, and withdraw as
soon as conditions allow.
Additionally, the public must be made aware of the costs up front. Force
must be committed only when there is a consensus of understanding among the
American people that the effort is in the best interests of the United States.35
There is a belief that “Congress should declare war whenever large numbers of
U.S. troops engage in sustained combat,” and that the American people must be
mobilized because “a nation cannot fight in cold blood.”36 Since time is crucial,
furthermore, sufficient force must be used at the outset to ensure that the conflict can be resolved before the American people withdraw their support for it.37
Finally, Vietnam has led the senior military to believe that in the
future, political leaders must better define objectives before putting soldiers
at risk. “Don’t send military forces off to do anything unless you know
what it is clearly that you want done,” warned then-Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs General John Vessey in 1983. “I am absolutely, unalterably opposed
to risking American lives for some sort of military and political objectives
that we don’t understand.”38
In short, rather than preparing to fight the last war, as generals and
admirals are often accused of doing, contemporary military leaders seem far
more inclined to avoid any involvement overseas that could become another
Vietnam. The lessons taken from Vietnam work to that end; military support
for the use of force abroad is contingent on the presence of specific preconditions chosen with an eye to avoiding a repetition of the US experience in
Southeast Asia.

Using the Lessons of Vietnam
The lessons of Vietnam as drawn by American military leaders do,
however, have their limitations. While they represent the distillation of considerable wisdom from America’s experience in Indochina, they nonetheless give
rise to certain paradoxical prescriptions and should not be pushed beyond their
limits. As this section will show, total resolution of the paradoxes that reside
in the lessons of Vietnam is not possible, nor should it be expected given the
nature of world events and domestic politics. Nonetheless, awareness of the
limitations of the lessons of Vietnam is necessary if they are to be employed
with sound judgement.
Users of the lessons of Vietnam should, first of all, recognize and strive
to avoid the general pitfalls that await anyone who seeks useful analogies in
the past. Most important, the fact that Vietnam was America’s most recent
major military engagement is no reason that it, rather than earlier conflicts,
should be most relevant to future conflicts. Senior officials should remember
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the contextual circumstances of American involvement in Vietnam—the
social fragmentation there, the leadership void, the difficult political situation,
the geostrategic position, and so forth. They would be wise to recall Stanley
Karnow’s reminder that each foreign event “has its own singularities, which
must be confronted individually and creatively. To see every crisis as another
Vietnam is myopic, just as overlaying the Munich debacle on Vietnam was
a distortion.”39 Hence specific guidelines for the use of force that draw on
Vietnam, such as those discussed earlier and those announced by Secretary of
Defense Weinberger,40 should be applied with discrimination to specific cases
and their circumstances, rather than in the rote manner that one-line principles
of war are sometimes employed.
Policy-makers employing the lessons of Vietnam, or the lessons of any
other past event, should resist the American tendency for overgeneralization.41
For if nothing else, Vietnam should teach that global, holistic approaches do
not work.42 In short, when drawing on the lessons of Vietnam, senior officers
should do well to recall the advice of Mark Twain:
We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom that
is in it—and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down on a hot
stove lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove lid again—and that
is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one.43

Beyond recognizing such general pitfalls that can snare users of historical analogies, military leaders also should be aware of the paradoxes that
reside in certain of the prescriptions derived from the lessons of Vietnam. In
particular, the guidelines taken from America’s experience in Vietnam contain
a significant dilemma about when to use force, appear to embody a potentially
counterproductive approach to civil-military relations, and create a quandary
over counterinsurgency doctrine and force structuring.
As explained earlier, many military leaders have concluded on the basis
of the Vietnam experience that the United States should not intervene abroad
militarily unless: there is support at home; there are clear political and military
objectives; success appears achievable within a reasonable time; and military
commanders will be given the freedom to do what they believe is necessary
to achieve that success. The problem with such guidelines, as Robert Osgood
has observed, is that “acting upon them presupposes advance knowledge
about a complicated interaction of military and political factors that no one
can predict or guarantee.”44
Still, making judgments about such factors has always been part of
decisions to use military force. Statesmen and soldiers have always had to
assess the time and force required for success, the likelihood of public support,
and the potential gains and losses associated with any particular intervention
or escalation. Eliminating the uncertainty inherent in such determinations has
never been completely possible. But Vietnam and the relative decline in US
power (and hence America’s margin for error in international politics) over the
past two decades have heightened the importance of these judgments and made
them more problematic. The normal response to this kind uncertainty is—and
has been—caution and restraint.
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Restraint rests uneasily, however, alongside another lesson of Vietnam:
that if the United States is going to intervene it should do so quickly and massively in order to arrive in force while the patient still has strong vital signs.45
But getting there faster next time implies making the decision to intervene in
force early on. It requires overwhelming commitment from the outset so that, as
George Fielding Eliot prescribes, “we shall . . . look like military winners from
the start of hostilities” and thereby “win popular support at home and confidence
abroad.” The American effort, therefore, should be designed to raise immediate
doubt that the United States will permit a war to become protracted.46
Eliot does not specify, however, how long the appearance of winning
will satisfy the American public in the absence of actual victory. Furthermore,
getting there earlier next time is more easily said than done. Several postVietnam (and post-Watergate) developments—the 1973 War Powers Act, the
decline of the “imperial presidency,” increased congressional involvement in
national security policy, and public wariness over involvement in another quagmire—pose obstacles to swift American action. Coupled with the short-term
focus of political leaders and the constitutional separation of powers, these
new phenomena (at least in post-World War II terms) make it difficult for the
United States to decide early to intervene in any but the most clear-cut of circumstances. It usually takes what can be presented as a crisis before the United
States is able to swing into action. The result is the oft-heard judgment that
America is good at fighting only crusades.
Military leaders are, of course, well aware of the obstacles to early
intervention. They realize that these obstacles, together with America’s general
inclination against involvement in situations that pose only an indirect threat
to US interests, have the potential for incomplete public backing. As a result,
senior military officers tend toward caution rather than haste, all the while
cognizant of the dilemma confronting them: the country that hesitates may
miss the opportune moment for effective action, while the country that acts in
haste may become involved in a conflict that it may wish later it had avoided.
Another difficulty posed by the lessons drawn from the Vietnam
experience centers on the issue of civil-military relations. During the Vietnam
era, the traditional military suspicions of civilians hardened into more acute
misgivings about civilian officials. This feeling lingers despite the apparently
close philosophical ties on the use of force between the incumbent Secretary of
Defense, Caspar Weinberger, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.47
Yet such misgivings pose potential risks. Two post-World War II developments at either end of the so-called “spectrum of conflict,” the advent of
nuclear weapons and the rise of insurgencies, have made close civil-military
integration more essential than ever before.
Counterinsurgency operations, in particular, require close civil-military
cooperation. Unfortunately, this requirement runs counter to the traditional
military desire, reaffirmed in the lessons of Vietnam, to operate autonomously
and resist political meddling and micromanagement in operational concerns.
Military officers are of course intimately aware of Clausewitz’s dictum that
war is a continuation of politics by other means; many, however, do not
appear to accept fully the implications of Clausewitzian logic. This can cause
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problems, for while military resistance to political micromanagement is often
well founded, it can, if carried to excess, be counterproductive. As Eliot Cohen
has noted:
Small war almost always involves political interference in the affairs
of the country in which it is waged; it is in the very nature of such wars
that the military problems are difficult to distinguish from the political
ones. The skills of manipulation which successful coalition warfare in
such circumstances requires are not only scarce, but in some measure
anathema to the American military. The desire of the American military to handle only pure “military” problems is . . . understandable in
light of its Vietnam experience, but unrealistic nonetheless.48

Hence, particularly in such “small wars,” military leaders should not
allow experience of Vietnam to reinforce the traditional military desire for
autonomy in a way that impedes the crucial integration of political and military
strategies. The organizational desire to be left alone must not lead those who
bear the sword to lose their appreciation for the political and economic context
in which it is wielded. For while military force may be necessary in certain
cases, it is seldom sufficient.49
Another paradox posed by the lessons of Vietnam concerns preparations for counterinsurgency warfare. The Vietnam experience left the military
leadership feeling that they should advise against involvement in counterinsurgencies unless specific, perhaps unlikely, circumstances obtain. Committing
US units to such contingencies appears a starkly problematic step—difficult
to conclude before domestic support erodes and potentially so costly as to
threaten the well-being of all of America’s military forces (and hence the
country’s national security), not just those involved in the actual counterinsurgency. Senior military officers remember that Vietnam cost not only tens
of thousands of lives, but also a generation of investment in new weapons
and other equipment.50 Morale plummeted throughout the military and society
were soured for nearly a decade.
A logical extension of this reasoning is that forces designed specifically
for counterinsurgencies should not be given high priority, since if there are no
sizable forces suitable for counterinsurgencies it will be easier to avoid involvement in that type of conflict.51 An American president cannot commit what is
not available. Similarly, along this line of thinking, plans for such contingencies
should not be pursued with too much vigor.52
There are two problems with such reasoning, however. First, presidents
may commit the United States to a conflict whether optimum forces exist or
not. President Truman’s decision to commit American ground troops to the
defense of South Korea in 1950, for example, came as a surprise to military
offices, who expected to execute a previously approved contingency plan that
called for withdrawal of all American troops from the Korean peninsula in the
event of an invasion. The early reverses in the ensuing conflict resulted in large
measure from inadequate military readiness for such a mission.53 So, prudence
requires a certain flexibility in forces, especially if the overall national strategy
opens the possibility of involvement in operations throughout the spectrum of
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conflict (as it presently appears to do). If commitment to counterinsurgency
operations is possible, the military should be prepared for it.
The second problem posed by such reasoning is that American involvement in counterinsurgencies is almost universally regarded as more likely than
involvement in most other types of combat—more likely, for example, than
involvement in high-intensity conflict on the plains of NATO’s Central Region
(though, of course, conflicts in Europe potentially would have more significant
consequences).54 Indeed, the United States is already involved in counterinsurgencies, albeit not with US combat troops. American military trainers in
El Salvador are assisting an ally combatting an insurgency, and, depending
on one’s definitions, US military elements are also providing assistance to a
number of other countries fighting insurgents, among them, Chad, Colombia,
Ecuador, Honduras, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Sudan, and Thailand.
The senior military is thus in a dilemma. The lessons taken from
Vietnam would indicate that, in general, involvement in a counterinsurgency
should be avoided. But prudent preparation for a likely contingency (and a
general inclination against limiting a president’s options) lead the military
to recognize that significant emphasis should be given to counterinsurgency
forces, equipment, and doctrine. Military leaders are thereby in the difficult
position of arguing for the creation of more forces suitable for such conflicts,
while simultaneously realizing they may advise against the use of those forces
unless very specific circumstances hold.55
Until recently the inclination against involvement in counterinsurgencies seemed to outweigh the need for a sufficient counterinsurgent capability.
Relatively little emphasis was given to preparation for this form of conflict,
either in assisting other governments to help themselves or in developing
American capabilities for more direct involvement.
There has been developing, however, gradual recognition that involvement in small wars is not only likely, it is upon us. It would seem wise, therefore,
to come to grips with what appears to be an emerging fact for the US military,
that American involvement in low-intensity conflict is unavoidable given the
more assertive US foreign policy of recent years and the developments in many
Third World countries, particularly those in our own hemisphere. It would
be timely to seek ways to assist allies in counterinsurgency operations, ways
consistent with the constraints of the American political culture and system, as
well as with the institutional agendas of the military services.56 One conclusion
may be that in some cases, contrary to the lessons of Vietnam, it would be better
to use American soldiers in small numbers than in strength to help a foreign
government counter insurgents. Indeed, given the example of congressional
limits on the number of trainers in El Salvador, the Army in particular should
be figuring out how best to assist others within what might be anticipated as
similar limits in other situations, while always remembering that it is the host
country’s war to win or lose.
Given that conclusion, the military should look beyond critiques of
American involvement in Vietnam that focus exclusively on alternative conventional military strategies that might have been pursued. For all their value,
such studies seldom address important unconventional elements of struggles
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such as Vietnam (although, of course, what eventually defeated South Vietnam
was a massive invasion by North Vietnam forces) and several contemporary
theaters. As Professor John Gates wrote in a 1984 Parameters article,
Any analysis that denies the important revolutionary dimension of
the Vietnam conflict is misleading, leaving the American people, their
leaders, and their professionals inadequately prepared to deal with
similar problems in the future . . . . Instead of forcing the military to
come to grips with the problems of revolutionary warfare that now
exist in nations such as Guatemala or El Salvador, [such an] analysis
leads officers back into the conventional war model that provided so
little preparation for solving the problems faced in Indochina by the
French, the Americans, and their Vietnamese allies. Such a businessas-usual approach is much too complacent in a world plagued by the
unconventional warfare associated with revolution and attempts to
counter it.57

The most serious charge leveled at the lessons of Vietnam is made by
those who perceive them as promising national paralysis in the face of international provocation. This contention is also the most difficult to contend with
because of its generality. The argument is that insistence upon domestic consensus before employing US forces is too demanding a requirement—that if it
were rigorously applied it would, in the words of former Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger, “virtually assure other powers that they can count on not
facing American force.” Schlesinger goes on to explain:
The likeliest physical challenges to the United States come in the
third world—not in Europe or North America. If the more predatory
states in the third world are given assurance that they can employ,
directly or indirectly, physical force against American interests
with impunity, they will feel far less restraint in acting against our
interests. Americans historically have embraced crusades—such as
World War II—as well as glorious little wars. The difficulty is that
the most likely conflicts of the future fall between crusades and such
brief encounters as Grenada and Mayaguez. Yet these in-between
conflicts have weak public support. Even . . . with national unity and
at the height of our power public enthusiasm for Korea and Vietnam
evaporated in just a year or two. The problem is that virtually no
opportunity exists for future crusades—and those glorious wars are
likely to occur infrequently. The role of the United States in the world
is such that it must be prepared for, be prepared to threaten, and even
be prepared to fight those intermediate conflicts—that are likely to
fare poorly on television.58

As Schlesinger was quick to acknowledge, however, there is no ready
solution to the perplexities he described. Nor are there clear-cut solutions to the
other ambiguities that reside in the lessons of Vietnam. The only certainty seems
to be that searching reflection about what ought to be taken from America’s
experience in Vietnam should continue, for only with further examination
will thoughtful understanding replace visceral revulsion when we think about
America’s difficulties in Vietnam.
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Conclusions
History in general, and the American experience in Vietnam in particular, have much to teach us, but both must be used with discretion and neither
should be pushed too far.59 In particular, the Vietnam analogy, for all its value
as the most recent large-scale use of American force abroad, has limits. The
applicability of the lessons drawn from Vietnam, just like the applicability of
lessons taken from any other past event, always will depend on the contextual circumstances. We should avoid the trap of considering only the Vietnam
analogy, and not allow it to overshadow unduly other historical events that
appear to offer insight and perspective.
Nor should Vietnam be permitted to become such a dominant influence
in the minds of decision-makers that it inhibits the discussion of specific events
on their own merits. It would be more profitable to address the central issues
of any particular case that arises than to debate endlessly whether the situation
could evolve into “another Vietnam.” In their use of history politicians and
military planners alike would do well to recall David Fischer’s finding that “the
utility of historical knowledge consists . . . in the enlargement of substantive
contexts within which decisions are made, . . . in the refinement of a thought
structure which is indispensable to purposeful decisionmaking.”60
Thus we should beware literal application of lessons extracted from
Vietnam, or any other past event, to present or future problems without due
regard for the specific circumstances that surround those problems. Study of
Vietnam—and of other historical occurrences—should endeavor to gain perspective and understanding, rather than hard and fast lessons that might be
applied too easily without proper reflection and sufficiently rigourous analysis.
“Each historical situation is unique,” George Herring has warned, “and the use
of analogy is at best misleading, at worst, dangerous.”61
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